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a b s t r a c t
We consider n-person positional games with perfect information modeled by finite
directed graphs that may have directed cycles, assuming that all infinite plays form a
single outcome c , in addition to the standard outcomes a1, . . . , am formed by the terminal
positions. (For example, in the case of Chess or Backgammon n = 2 and c is a draw.)
Thesem+1 outcomes are ranked arbitrarily by n players. We study existence of (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies and provide
a systematic case analysis assuming one of the following conditions:
(i) there are no random positions; (ii) there are no directed cycles; (iii) the ïnfinite
outcome’’ c is ranked as the worst one by all n players; (iv) n = 2; (v) n = 2 and the
payoff is zero-sum.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Summary
In this article we study Nash-solvability (NS) and improvement acyclicity (AC) of finite n-person positional games with
perfect information in pure positional strategies. A game is modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph) G = (V , E)whose
vertex-set V is partitioned into n + 2 subsets V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn ∪ VR ∪ VT , where Vi are the positions of a player
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while VR and VT = {a1, . . . , am} are the random and terminal positions. A game is called Chess-like
if VR = ∅ and Backgammon-like in general.
Digraph Gmay have directed cycles (di-cycles), yet, we assume that all infinite plays form a single outcome c , in addition
to the terminal outcomes VT .
The standard Chess and Backgammon are two-person (n = 2) zero-sum games in which c is defined as a draw. Yet, in
a Chess-like game, n players I = {1, . . . , n} may rank m + 1 outcomes A = {a1, . . . , am, c} arbitrarily. Furthermore, an
arbitrary real-valued utility (called also payoff) function u : I × A → R is defined for a Backgammon-like game.
Remark 1. The Backgammon-like games can be viewed as transition-free stochastic games with perfect information, in which
the local reward r(i, e) is 0 for each player i ∈ I and move e, unless e is a terminal move, which results in a terminal position
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Table 1
Main diagram. Notation: NS = Nash-solvability, AC = Acyclicity; I = Initialized: for a given initial position, U = Uniform: for all initial positions
simultaneously; Y = the property holds for the class, N = it does not, ? = the problem is open; the letter is calligraphic if the corresponding result is
new and it is bold if the table contains no stronger result, otherwise, the font is standard. Columns of the table are partitioned in accordance with the
assumption (i), which holds for the left and fails for the right four columns; furthermore, row 6 is related to assumption (ii), rows 2 and 4 to (iii), rows 3
and 4 to (iv), and row 5 to (v).
INS IAC UNS UAC games INS IAC UNS UAC
? N N N n-person N N N N
? N N N n-person and c is the worst N N N N
Y Y N N 2-person N N N N
Y Y N N 2-person and c is the worst N N N N
Y Y Y Y 2-person zero-sum Y N Y N
Y Y Y Y n person with no di-cycles Y Y Y Y
Chess-like games; In any case, all di-cycles Backgammon-like games;
No randommoves Form one outcome c May have randommoves
v ∈ VT . Obviously, in this case all infinite plays are equivalent, since the effective payoff is 0 for every such play. If n = 2 and
m = 1 then the zero-sum Backgammon-like games turn into the so-called simple stochastic games introduced by Condon
in [11,12].
All players are restricted to their pure positional strategies; see Section 2.8.
We will consider two concepts of solution: the classical Nash equilibrium (NE) and also a stronger one: the absence of
the (best response) improvement cycles.
The concept of solvability is defined as the existence of a solution for any utility function u. Respectively, we arrive to the
notions of Nash-solvability (NS) and improvement acyclicity (AC). Both concepts will be considered in two cases: initialized
(I), that is, with respect to a fixed initial position v0 ∈ V \ VT and uniform (U), that is, for all possible initial positions
simultaneously. In the literature, the latter case is frequently referred to as ergodic or subgame perfect; see Remark 6.
For the obtained four concepts INS, UNS, IAC, UAC the following implications hold:
UAC⇒ IAC⇒ INS, UAC⇒ UNS⇒ INS.
Remark 2. All four conceptswill be formally defined and discussed in details in the next section. Yet, AC (unlike NS) requires
several immediate comments, as an anonymous referee suggested. In each situation (strategy profile) x = (xi | i ∈ I) we
restrict the players i ∈ I by their ‘‘uniformly best’’ responses x∗i = x∗i (x) satisfying an additional ‘‘laziness’’ condition. Here,
‘‘uniformly best’’ means the best with respect to all possible initial positions simultaneously. The existence of a uniformly
best response is guaranteed by Theorem 2. Furthermore, a response x∗i = x∗i (x) is called lazy if the set of positions in which
the decision xi is changed in order to improve the result of the player i cannot be reduced without changing the result itself.
The state of art is summarized in Table 1 that contains criteria for AC and NS based on the following assumptions:
(i) there are no random positions; (ii) there are no directed cycles; (iii) the ‘‘infinite outcome’’ c is ranked as the worst
one by all n players; (iv) n = 2; (v) n = 2 and the payoff is zero-sum.
Let us briefly discuss the most important results of Table 1.
The classical backward induction algorithm [16,30,31], searching for some special uniformNash equilibria in then-person
Chess-like games on trees, can be just slightlymodified to prove theUAC for the n-personBackgammon-like games on acyclic
digraphs; see the last row of the table and Section 6.
Another modification of the backward induction was recently applied to the two-person zero-sum Chess-like games on
arbitrary finite digraphs to show their UNS (and INS) [2,8]. In Section 4 we slightly strengthen this result by proving UAC as
well; see row 5 in the left-hand (Chess-like) side of the table.
As for the right-hand side of this row, that is, for the two-person zero-sumBackgammon-like games, the situation ismore
complicated: UNS (and INS) still hold. This result was derived in [8] from the existence of the uniformly optimal strategies
for the classical two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and limiting mean payoff [18,34]; see
Theorem 5 of Section 5. Yet, IAC (and UAC) fail for the two-person zero-sum Backgammon-like games, the corresponding
example was constructed in [12].
Furthermore, IAC (and INS) hold for the two-person Chess-like games, that is, (iv), evenwithout (iii) or (v), implies IAC [1]
and, in particular, INS [7]; see row 3 of the table. However, these results cannot be extended to the uniform case or to
Backgammon-like two-person, but non-zero-sum, games. In other words, INS (and IAC) (respectively, UNS (and UAC)) may
fail, even under assumption (iii), for the two-person Backgammon-like (respectively, Chess-like) games; see row 4 of the
table and Section 3.
Remark 3. Interestingly, the rows 1 and 2, as well as 3 and 4, of Table 1 are identical. In other words, it is not clear whether
condition (iii) matters at all. Definitely, it helps a lot in proving NS, because forcing a di-cycle becomes a punishing strategy
when (iii) holds.
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Finally, the fundamental question, whether a game with a fixed initial position and without random moves is Nash-
solvable (that is, INS for Chess-like games) remains open. For the two-person case, n ≤ 2, the answer is positive [7]; see
also [1] and the last section of [9]. Yet, in general, there is no counterexample and no proof, even under assumption (iii).
Although, in the latter case some partial results are known:
(j) INS holds whenm = |VT | ≤ 3, that is, for at most 4 outcomes [10];
(jj) INS also holds for the play-once games, in which each player is in control of at most one position, |Vi| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I [7].
In [7], INS was conjectured for the n-person Chess-like games satisfying (iii) and, in fact, for a much larger class of games
with the so-called additive costs; see [7] and Section 8 for the definitions andmore details. It was shown in [7] that (iii) holds
for these games whenever all local costs are non-negative and that INS may fail otherwise; in other words, the assumption
(iii) seems essential in the considered case.
2. Introduction
2.1. Positional game structures
Given a finite digraph G = (V , E) in which loops andmultiple arcs are allowed; a vertex v ∈ V is interpreted as a position
and a directed edge (arc) e = (v, v′) ∈ E as amove from v to v′. A position of out-degree 0 (with nomoves) is called terminal.
Let VT = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of all terminal positions.
Let us also introduce a set of n players I = {1, . . . , n} and a partition D : V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn ∪ VR ∪ VT ; each player i ∈ I
is in control of all positions of Vi, while VR is the set of random positions, called also positions of chance. For each v ∈ VR a
probability distribution over the set of outgoing arcs is fixed.
An initial position v0 ∈ V may be fixed. The triplet (G,D, v0) or pair (G,D) is called a positional game structure, initialized
or non-initialized, respectively.
A positional game structure is called Chess-like if there are no positions of chance, VR = ∅, and it is called Backgammon-
like, in general. Eight examples of the non-initialized Chess-like game structuresG2,G3,G4,G6 and initialized Backgammon-
like game structures G′2,G
′
3,G
′
4,G
′
6 are given in Fig. 1.
2.2. Plays, outcomes, preferences, and payoffs
Given an initialized positional game structure (G,D, v0), a play is defined as a directed path that begins in v0 and either
ends in a terminal position a ∈ VT or is infinite.
In this article we assume that All Infinite Plays Form One Outcome c , in addition to the standard Terminal outcomes of
VT . (In [8], this condition was referred to as AIPFOOT.)
Remark 4. In contrast, in [9,20,19,21] it was assumed that all di-cycles form pairwise distinct outcomes. A criterion of Nash-
solvability was obtained for the two-person symmetric case, that is, when n = 2 and e = (v, v′) is an arc whenever
e′ = (v′, v) is.
A utility (or payoff) function is a mapping u : I × A → R, whose value u(i, a) is interpreted as a profit of the player
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} in the case of the outcome a ∈ A = {a1, . . . , am, c}.
A payoff is called zero-sum if

i∈I u(i, a) = 0 for every a ∈ A. Two-person zero-sum games will play an important role.
For example, the standard Chess and Backgammon are two-person zero-sum games in which every infinite play is a draw,
u(1, c) = u(2, c) = 0. It is not difficult to see that u(i, c) = 0 for all i ∈ I can be always assumed without any loss of
generality.
An important class of (non-zero-sum) payoffs is defined by the condition u(i, c) < u(i, a) for all i ∈ I and a ∈ VT ; in other
words, the infinite outcome c is ranked as the worst one by all players. Several possible motivations for this assumption are
discussed in [7,8].
A quadruple (G,D, v0, u) and triplet (G,D, u)will be called a Backgammon-like (or Chess-like, in the case VR = ∅) game,
initialized and non-initialized, respectively.
For Chess-like games only n total pre-orders o = {o(ui) | i ∈ I} over Amatter rather than the payoffs u(i, a) themselves.
Moreover, in this case, ties can be excluded; in other words, we can assume that o(ui) is a total order over A, called the
preference of the player i; for more details, see Remarks 7 and 9. The set of all preferences o = {o(ui) | i ∈ I} is called
the preference profile. In contrast, for Backgammon-like games the payoffs ui = u(i, a) do matter, since their probability
combinations are compared.
2.3. Strategies
Given a positional game structure (G,D), a strategy xi of a player i ∈ I is defined as a mapping xi : Vi → Ei that assigns to
each position v ∈ Vi a move (v, v′) from this position.
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Fig. 1. The non-initialized Chess-like game structures G2,G3,G4,G6 and the corresponding initialized Backgammon-like game structures G′2,G
′
3,G
′
4,G
′
6 .
For j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6}, the positional game structure Gj contains a unique di-cycle of the length j. In G3 , there are three players controlling one position each,
while in G2,G4 , and G6 there are only two players who take turns; hence, each of them controls j/2 positions. In each position vℓ , the corresponding player
has only two options: (p) to proceed to vℓ+1 and (t) to terminate at aℓ , where ℓ = 1, . . . , j and j+ 1 = 1, by a convention. Furthermore, for j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6},
the positional game structure G′j is obtained from Gj by adding one position v0 , which is random, initial, and marked by ‘‘X ’’. There is a move from v0 to
each position vℓ of the di-cycle. The probabilities are not fixed yet assumed to be strictly positive. To save space we show only symbols aℓ but not vℓ .
Remark 5. In this article, we restrict the players to their pure positional strategies. In other words, the move (v, v′) of a
player i ∈ I in a position v ∈ Vi is deterministic (not random) and it depends only on the position v itself (not on the
preceding positions or moves). Every considered strategy is assumed to be pure and positional unless it is explicitly said
otherwise.
Let Xi be the set of all strategies of a player i ∈ I and X = i∈I Xi be the direct product of these sets. An element
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is called a strategy profile or situation.
2.4. Normal forms
A positional game structure G can be represented in normal (or strategic) form.
We distinguish four cases, considering whether G is Chess- or Backgammon-like and initialized or not.
Given a Chess-like initialized positional game structure G = (G,D, v0) and a strategy profile x ∈ X , a play p(x) is naturally
and uniquely defined by the following rules: it begins in v0 and in each position v ∈ Vi proceedswith the arc (v, v′) according
to the strategy xi. Obviously, p(x) either ends in a terminal position a ∈ VT , or p(x) is infinite. In the latter case p(x) is a lasso,
i.e., it consists of an initial path that leads to a di-cycle repeated infinitely. The latter holds, because all players are restricted
to their positional strategies.
Anyway, an outcome a =∈ A = {a1, . . . , am, c} is assigned to every strategy profile x ∈ X . Thus, a game form gv0 : X → A
is defined. It is called the normal form of the positional game structure G.
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Fig. 2. The normal forms g2 and g3 of the positional game structures G2 and G3 from Fig. 1. Each player has only two strategies: to terminate (t) or proceed
(p). Respectively, g2 and g3 are represented by the 2 × 2 and 2 × 2 × 2 tables each entry of which contains 2 and 3 terminals corresponding to 2 and 3
(non-terminal) potential initial positions of G2 and G3 , respectively. The rows and columns are the strategies of the players 1 and 2, while two strategies
of the player 3 in g3 are the left and right 2 × 2 subtables. For each game, a preference profile is fixed and the corresponding lazy uniformly BR im-cycle
is shown. Thus, UAC fails in both cases. Two initialized game forms, corresponding to v1 and v2 , are given for g2 . In each of them the im-cycle is broken,
because of a tie. In fact, IAC hold for both game forms.
If the game structureG = (G,D) is not initialized thenwe apply the above construction for each initial position v0 ∈ V\VT
to obtain a mapping g : X × (V \ VT )→ A, which is the normal form of G in this case.
We will use the notation p = p(x, v0) and a = a(x, v0) = g(x, v0) = gv0(x) for the corresponding plays and outcomes,
respectively.
For Chess-like game structures in Fig. 1 their normal forms are given in Figs. 2 and 3.
In a Backgammon-like non-initialized game formG = (G,D), each strategy profile x ∈ X uniquely defines aMarkov chain
on V . Given also an initial position v0 ∈ V \ VT , this chain defines a unique limit probability distribution q = q(x, v0) on
A = {a1, . . . , am, c}, where q(a) = q(x, v0, a) is the probability to stop at a ∈ VT , while q(c) = q(x, v0, c) is the probability
of an infinite play. Let Q denote the set of all probability distributions over A. The obtained mappings gv0 : X → Q and
g : X× (V \VT )→ Q are the normal game forms of the above Backgammon-like game forms, initialized and non-initialized,
respectively.
Given also a payoff u : I × A → R, the normal form games for the above two cases are defined by the pairs (gv0 , u) and
(g, u), respectively. These games can be also represented by real-valued mappings
fv0 : I × X → R and f : I × X × (V \ VT )→ R.
Indeed, let us fix i ∈ I, x ∈ X , and v0 ∈ V \ VT ; having a probability distribution q(x, v0) over A and a real-valued payoff
function ui : A → R, where ui(a) = u(i, a), we compute the expected payoff by formula
f (i, x, v0) =

a∈A
q(x, v0, a)u(i, a).
In the case of Chess-like games, Markov chains and the corresponding limit probability distributions q = q(x, v0) ∈ Q
over A are replaced by deterministic plays and the corresponding outcomes a = g(x, v0) ∈ A; respectively, f (i, x, v0) =
u(i, g(x, v0)).
2.5. Nash equilibria
Let us recall the standard concept of the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the normal form games.
First, let us consider the initialized case. Given fv0 : I×X → R, a strategy profile x ∈ X is called a NE if fv0(i, x) ≥ fv0(i, x′)
for each player i ∈ I and every strategy profile x′ that can differ from x only in the ith component. In other words, no player
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Fig. 3. The normal forms g4 and g6 of the positional game structures G4 and G6 from Fig. 1. In each case there are two players, who control 2 positions each
in G4 and 3 positions each in G6 . Again, in every position there are only two options: to terminate (t) or proceed (p). Hence, in G4 and G6 , each player has,
respectively, 4 and 8 strategies, which are naturally coded by the 2- and 3-letter words in the alphabet {t, p}. Respectively, g4 and g6 are represented by
the 4× 4 and 8× 8 tables each entry of which contains 4 and 6 terminals corresponding to 4 and 6 (non-terminal) potential initial positions of G4 and G6 .
Again, players 1 and 2 control the rows and columns, respectively. In each game a preference profile is fixed. More precisely, 3 profiles are fixed in G6 , yet,
all three define the same cycle. Moreover, for each such profile u, the corresponding game (g6, u) has no uniform (subgame perfect) NE. Indeed, the (unique)
uniformly best response of the player 1 (respectively, 2) to each strategy of 2 (respectively, 1) is shown by a white disc (respectively, black square); the
obtained two sets are disjoint. In contrast, UNS holds for G4 , as a tedious verification shows. In particular, for the given preferences there are two uniform
Nash equilibria, shown in the figure together with a lazy uniformly BR im-cycle.
i ∈ I can profit by choosing a new strategy if all opponents keep their strategies unchanged. In the non-initialized case, the
similar property is required for each v0 ∈ V \ VT . Given f : I × X × (V \ VT )→ R, a strategy profile x ∈ X is called a uniform
NE if f (i, x, v0) ≥ f (i, x′, v0) for each i ∈ I , for every x′ defined as above, and for all v0 ∈ V \ VT , too.
Remark 6. In the literature, this concept is also called ‘‘a subgame perfect NE’’. This name is justified when the digraph
G = (V , E) is acyclic and each vertex v ∈ V can be reached from v0. Indeed, in this case (G,D, v, u) is a subgame of
(G,D, v0, u) for each v. However, if G has a di-cycle then any two of its vertices v′ and v′′ can be reached one from the other;
in other words, (G,D, v′, u) is a subgame of (G,D, v′′, u) and vice versa. Thus, the name a uniform (or ergodic) NE is more
accurate.
Remark 7. Let us also notice that for a Chess-like game, the inequality fv0(i, x) ≥ fv0(i, x′) is reduced to u(i, g(v0, x)) ≥
u(i, g(v0, x′)), which can be verified whenever a total pre-order oi over A is known. It should be verified for all i ∈ I and for a
given (respectively, for each) v0 ∈ V \ T in the initialized (respectively, non-initialized) case. Moreover, without any loss of
generality, total pre-orders can be replaced by (total) orders, as far as the NS of Chess-like games is concerned. Indeed, if a NE
exists with respect to all preference profiles (total orders) then it exists for all payoffs (total pre-orders) as well. It is enough
to notice that the concept of a NE is based on the absence of individual improvements, defined by strong inequalities. Hence,
any ‘‘merging of payoffs’’ may result only in creating some new equilibria, while the old ones remain.
2.6. On UNS of Chess-like and INS of Backgammon-like games
From the above definitions, it follows immediately that UNS implies INS.
The non-initialized Chess-like positional game structures G2,G3,G4,G6 given in Fig. 1 are not UNS. The corresponding
payoffs u2, u3, u4, u6 will be constructed in Section 3. Moreover, u3 and u6 will satisfy condition (iii): any di-cycle is the
worst outcome for all players. In contrast, games (G2, u2) and even (G4, u4) have uniformNEwhenever u2 and u4 satisfy (iii).
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For this reason, a larger example (G6, u6) is needed to show that UNS may fail for the two-person Chess-like games, even
under assumption (iii).
Let us also note that all obtained initialized game structures are INS for any choice of the initial position. Moreover, it is
an open problem, whether INS holds for all Chess-like games. This problem remains open even if (iii) is assumed. Yet, it is
solved in the affirmative for the two-person games, n = 2, even without assumption (iii); see [7] and also [1,9]. Thus, we
can fill the first four positions of the INS- and UNS-columns of the Chess-like (left-hand) side of Table 1.
Furthermore, the UNS of Chess-like games can be reduced to the INS of some special Backgammon-like games as follows.
Given a non-initialized Chess-like game G = (G,D, u), let us add to its digraph G = (V , E) a random initial position
v0 and a move (v0, v) from v0 to each position v ∈ V \ VT . Furthermore, let us define probabilities q(v0, v) such that
v∈V\VT q(v0, v) = 1 and denote the obtained probability distribution and initialized Backgammon-like game by q(v0)
and G′, respectively. By construction, games G and G′ have the same set X of the strategy profiles. The following relations
between G and G′ hold.
Theorem 1. (i) If x ∈ X is a uniform NE in G then it is a NE for every q(v0) in G′.
(ii) If x ∈ X is a NE in G′ for some strictly positive q(v0) then x is a uniform NE in G.
Part (i) is obvious; part (ii) will be proved in Section 7. The next corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. The following three claims are equivalent:
(j) G is UNS;
(jj) G′ is INS for some strictly positive q(v0);
(jj′) G′ is INS for each strictly positive q(v0). 
This corollary and the previous results allow us to fill with ‘‘N ’’ the first four positions in the INS (and UNS) columns of
the Backgammon (right-hand) side of Table 1.
The fifth row of this table shows that UNS (and INS) hold for the two-person zero-sum games. This statement will be
derived from the classical Gillette theorem [18]; see also [8,24], and Section 6.
Finally, according to the last row of the table, UNS holds for acyclic digraphs. In this case uniform Nash equilibria can be
obtained by a slight modification of the classical backward induction procedure [16,30,31]; see Section 4.
2.7. Uniform and lazy best responses
Again, let us start with the initialized case. Given the normal form fv0 : I × X → R of an initialized Backgammon-like
game, a player i ∈ I , and a pair of strategy profiles x, x′ such that x′ may differ from x only in the ith component, we say that
x′ improves x (for the player i) if fv0(i, x) < fv0(i, x
′).
Let us underline that the inequality is strict and remark that a situation x ∈ X is a NE if and only if it can be improved by
no player i ∈ I . In other words, any sequence of improvements (an im-path) either cycles, or terminates in a NE.
Given a player i ∈ I and situation x = (xi | i ∈ I), a strategy x∗i ∈ Xi is called a best response (BR) of i in x, if
fv0(i, x
∗) ≥ fv0(i, x′) for any x′, where x∗ and x′ are both obtained from x by replacement of its ith component xi by x∗i
and x′i , respectively. A BR x
∗
i is not necessarily unique but the corresponding best achievable value fv0(i, x
∗) is, of course,
unique.Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, such best values can be achieved by a BR x∗i simultaneously for all initial positions
v0 ∈ V \ VT .
Theorem 2. Let us fix a player i ∈ I and situation x ∈ X in the normal form f : I × X × (V \ VT ) → R of a non-initialized
Backgammon-like game. Then, there is a (pure positional) strategy x∗i ∈ Xi which is the best response of i in x for all initial positions
v0 ∈ V \ VT simultaneously.
We will call such a strategy x∗i a uniformly BR of the player i in the situation x. Obviously, the non-strict inequality
fv(i, x) ≤ fv(i, x∗) holds for each position v ∈ V . Wewill say that x∗i improves x if this inequality is strict, fv0(i, x) < fv0(i, x∗),
for at least one v0 ∈ V . This statement will serve as the definition of a uniform improvement for the non-initialized case.
Let us remark that, by this definition, x ∈ X is a uniform NE if and only if it can be uniformly improved by no player i ∈ I . In
other words, any sequence of uniform improvements (a uniform im-path) either cycles or terminates in a uniform NE.
Remark 8. We will prove Theorem 2 in Section 5, by viewing a Backgammon-like game as a stochastic game with perfect
information and transition-free payoff. Namely, the local reward r(i, e) equals u(i, a) for each terminal move e = (v, a), a ∈
VT , and r(i, e′) = 0 for any non-terminal move e′ = (v, v′), v′ ∉ VT . Then, the search for a BR in a given situation x ∈ X is
reduced to a controlled Markov chain problem. It is well known that in this case a uniformly optimal (pure) strategy exists
and can be found by linear programming; moreover, even if the player i is allowed to use history dependent strategies, still
there is a (uniformly) best response in positional strategies; see, for example, [4,35], also [5,6,40], and Section 2.8.
For Chess-like games, Theorem2 can be proved by the following,much simpler, arguments. Given a non-initialized Chess-
like game G = (G,D, u), a player i ∈ I , and a strategy profile x ∈ X , in every position v ∈ V \ (Vi ∪ VT ) let us fix a move
(v, v′) in accordance with x and delete all other moves.
E. Boros et al. / Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 772–788 779
Let us order A according to the preference ui = u(i, ∗). Let a1 ∈ A be the best outcome. (Note that a1 = c might hold.)
Let V 1 be the set of positions from which player i can reach a1; in particular, we have a1 ∈ V 1. Let us fix corresponding
moves in V 1 ∩Vi. By definition, there are no moves to a1 from V \V 1. Moreover, if a1 = c then player i can reach no di-cycle
beginning from V \ V 1; in particular, the induced digraph G1 = G[V \ V 1] contains no di-cycles. Then, let us consider an
outcome a2 that is the next best for i in A, after a1, and repeat the same arguments for G1 and a2, etc. This procedure will
result in a uniformly best response x∗i of i in x, since all chosen moves of player i are optimal independently of v0. 
Remark 9. Again, without any loss of generality, total pre-orders can be replaced with the (total) orders, as far as the AC (or
NS) of Chess-like games are concerned. Indeed, an improvement requires a strict inequality (for at least one initial position).
Hence, if AC holds for all preference profiles (total orders) then it holds for all payoffs (total pre-orders) as well. To show
this, it is enough to notice that any ‘‘merging of payoffs’’ may result only in elimination of improvement cycles but no new
one can appear.
Remark 10. Let us also mention in passing that a uniformly BR exists and it can be found by the same procedure when
di-cycles form not one but several distinct outcomes, like in [9,20,19,21].
Let x∗i be a BR of the player i in a situation x = (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn). It may happen that xi and x∗i recommend two distinct
moves, (v, v′) and (v, v′′), in a position v ∈ Vi, although the original strategy xi is already optimal with respect to v; in other
words, g(i, x, v) is a (unique) optimal outcome for the initial position v but the considered BR changes an optimal move in
v, which is not necessary.
A BR x∗i is called lazy if this happens for no v ∈ Vi. A similar definition was introduced in [1] for the initialized Chess-like
games. In general, for Backgammon-like games, a BR will be called lazy if the subset V ′i ⊆ Vi in which xi and x∗i require the
same move cannot be strictly increased.
Remark 11. We will not discuss how to verify the laziness condition. In fact, we will make use of it only in Section 5, for
Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs and in this case the problem becomes simple. It is also simple for Chess-like
games on arbitrary digraphs.
In this article, we restrict the players by their lazy uniformly BRs unless the opposite is explicitly said.
2.8. Best response and Nash equilibria in history dependent strategies
In this paper, all players are restricted to their positional strategies. To justify this restriction, in this subsection we
eliminate it and show that the result of the game will not change.
Let (G,D, v0) be an initialized positional game structure. A sequence of positions d = (v0, v1, . . . , vk) such that (vj−1, vj)
∈ E is a move for j = 1, . . . , k is called a debut. Let us notice that the same position may occur in d several times.
A general, history dependent, strategy xi of a player i ∈ I is a mapping that assigns a move (v, v′) to every debut
d = (v0, v1, . . . , vk) in which vk = v ∈ Vi.
Let us recall that strategy xi is positional if in each position v ∈ Vi the chosen move depends only on v but not on the
preceding positions of the debut. Let Xi and X ′i denote the sets of all positional and general (history dependent) strategies of
a player i ∈ I; by definition, Xi ⊆ X ′i . Furthermore, let X =

i∈I Xi and X ′ =

i∈I X
′
i be the sets of positional and general
strategy profiles; clearly, X ⊆ X ′.
Now, we can strengthen Theorem 2 by simply noting that the positional strategy x∗i ∈ Xi, which is a uniform BR of the
player i ∈ I in the situation x ∈ X , is still a uniform BR of i, even if we extend Xi to X ′i .
The new version of Theorem 2 immediately implies that each (uniform) NE in positional strategies is a general (uniform)
NE; in other words, if x∗ ∈ X is a (uniform) NE with respect to X then it is a (uniform) NE with respect to X ′, as well.
The claim holds for both Chess- and Backgammon-like games, initialized and non-initialized cases. In particular, history
dependent strategies may be ignored in the case of the two-person zero-sum games, since a saddle point in (uniform)
positional strategies always exists in this case. Yet in general, theremay be no NE in X , while in X ′ its existence is guaranteed
by the so-called ‘‘folk theorems’’.
Finally, let us mention that NS in history dependent strategies was recently proven in [15]. More precisely, the authors
showed that an ε-NE in pure (but history dependent) strategies exists in n-person Backgammon-like games and, moreover,
ε = 0 can be chosen for Chess-like games, provided all infinite plays are equivalent and ranked as the worst outcome for
each player. Let us also recall that INS in positional strategies in the considered case remains an open problem.
2.9. Improvement cycles and acyclicity
Let fv0 : I × X → R (respectively, f : I × X × (V \ VT ) → R) be the normal form of an initialized (respectively, non-
initialized) Backgammon-like game. A sequence x0, . . . , xk−1 ∈ X of strategy profiles is called a uniformly best improvement
cycle, or just an im-cycle, for short, if xj+1 is a uniformly BR improvement of xj by a player i = i(j) ∈ I , for j = 0, . . . , k− 1,
where the indices are taken modulo k.
Let us recall that in both initialized and non-initialized cases the players are restricted to their lazy uniformly best
responses.
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Remark 12. The concept of an improvement cycle (im-cycle) was introduced in 1838 by Cournot [13] (112 years before
Nash’s equilibria [36,37]). Yet, AC of positional games was considered just recently, by Kukushkin [32,33]. He restricted
himself to IAC and to the games modeled by trees and demonstrated that even in this case im-cycles may appear. In fact,
they exist already in a very simple two-person zero-sum game, with only four terminals; see Example 3 of [32]. Then, to
reduce the set of im-cycles he restricted the improvements, allowing the individuals (players) to change their decisions
(moves) only in the positions within the actual play. Indeed, other changes make no sense, except for preparing further
improvements. Making use of this restriction, Kukushkin derived several interesting criteria of IAC.
In [1], these concepts and results were extended from trees to arbitrary finite digraphs. The individual improvements can
be restricted in many ways. For positional games, several new restrictions were suggested in [1] and an umbrella concept
of a restricted improvement (ri) and ri-acyclicitywere introduced.
In particular, Kukushkin’s ‘‘actual play restriction’’ was replaced with a stronger ‘‘laziness rule’’: an individual
improvement is lazy if the set of positions in which the individual decision was changed in order to get a better result
cannot be reduced without changing this result. In this article, we restrict the players to their lazy uniformly best responses,
both concepts of IAC and UAC being subject to this restriction. Obviously, even in this case, IAC and UAC imply INS and UNS,
respectively.
Let us also recall that an improvement is uniform if the new result is not worse than the original one with respect to
each initial position and is strictly better for at least one of them. Since such a position may vary from one improvement to
another, we conclude that UAC implies IAC but not vice versa.
The existence of a uniformly best response is guaranteed by Theorem 2. Although several such responses may exist, yet,
the BR profile of outcomes is unique; see, for example, Figs. 2 and 3.
A game is called im-acyclic (AC) if it has no im-cycles. Thus, the concepts of IAC and UAC appear for the initialized and
non-initialized games. Obviously, UAC implies IAC. Indeed, an initialized im-cycle is also a non-initialized one, but not vice
versa. The inverse holds only if all k improvements correspond to one initial position v0, while in a non-initialized im-cycle
they may correspond to different positions v(j) ∈ V for j = 0, 1, . . . , k− 1; see, for example, g2 in Fig. 2.
The implications (IAC⇒ INS) and (UAC⇒ UNS) also follow immediately from the above definitions.
Examples of im-cycles will be given in Section 3 for the non-initialized Chess-like games in Fig. 1. These examples allow
us to fill with ‘‘N ’’ the first four positions of the UAC-column in the left-hand side of Table 1. Furthermore, we refer to [1]
to fill the IAC-column. Indeed, Theorems 2 and 3 of [1] imply that IAC holds for the acyclic and two-person cases; see also
Sections 4 and 6, respectively.
Let us now consider the concepts of IAC and UAC for Backgammon-like games, that is, the right-hand side of Table 1. UAC
(and IAC) hold in the case of the acyclic digraphs; see [1] and also Section 4. Yet, in presence of di-cycles, IAC (and UAC) fail
in all five cases. The first four follow from Theorem 1 and examples of Section 3, while for two-person zero-sum games a
corresponding example was constructed in 1993 by Condon in [12].
3. Games with a unique di-cycle and without uniform Nash equilibria
Let us consider the non-initialized Chess-like positional game structures G2,G3,G4,G6 given in Fig. 1. Each digraph
Gj = (Vj, Ej) consists of a unique di-cycle Cj of length j and a matching connecting each vertex vjℓ of Cj to a terminal ajℓ,
where ℓ = 1, . . . , j and j = 2, 3, 4, 6. The digraphs G2,G4 and G6 are bipartite; respectively, G2,G4 and G6 are two-person
positional game structures in which two players move taking turns; G3 is a three-person game structure; G2 and G3 are
play-once, that is, each player controls a unique position. In every non-terminal position vjℓ there are only two moves; one
of them (t) immediately terminates in ajℓ, while the other one (p) proceeds along the di-cycle to v
j
ℓ+1; by a convention, we
set j+ 1 = 1.
Remark 13. In Figs. 1–3 the symbols ajℓ for the terminal positions are replaced by aℓ, to save space we omit the superscript
j. For the same purpose, in Fig. 1 we show only symbols aℓ but not v
j
ℓ.
Thus, in G2,G3,G4, and G6 each player has 2, 2, 4, and 8 strategies, respectively. For G2 and G3 each player has two
strategies coded by the letters t and p, while for G4 and G6 the strategies are coded by, respectively, the 2- and 3-letter
words in the alphabet {t, p}. For example, the strategy (tpt) of player 2 in G6 requires to proceed to v25 from v24 and to
terminate in a22 from v
2
2 and in a
2
6 from v
2
6 .
The corresponding normal game forms g2, g3, g4, g6 of size 2×2, 2×2×2, 4×4, and 8×8 are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. All
four game forms are non-initialized, that is, each situation is a set of 2, 3, 4, and 6 terminals, respectively. These terminals
correspond to the non-terminal positions of G2,G3,G4, and G6, each of which can serve as an initial position.
Let us start with g2 and consider the preference profile
o1 : c > a1 > a2, o2 : a1 > a2 > c;
in otherwords, player 1 likes and player 2 dislikes c themost,while both prefer a1 to a2. It is easily seen that all four situations
of g2 form an im-cycle; hence, none of them is a uniformNE; see Fig. 1. Thus, UNS fails for this example. In contrast, INS holds.
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In other words, if an initial position, v1 or v2, is fixed then the obtained initialized positional game structure has a NE for
every payoff. Both corresponding game forms, g2(v1) and g2(v2), are shown in Fig. 2. It is easy to verify that the considered
im-cycle is broken in each one by a tie. This example appeared in [1], Fig. 10; see also Fig. 1 of [8].
In addition to the above counterclockwise im-cycle, the clockwise one is defined by the preference profile
o = (o1, o2) such that o1 : a2 > a1 > c, o2 : c > a2 > a1.
Obviously, there can be no more im-cycles in a 2 × 2 game form. In both cases, the preferences o1 and o2 are not opposite
and the outcome c is the best for one player and the worst for the other.
Based on these simple observations, one could boldly conjecture that UNSholds for the two-person non-initialized Chess-
like games whenever:
(A) they are zero-sum or
(A) any di-cycle is the worst outcome c for both players.
As it will be shown in Section 6, Conjecture (A) holds, indeed, not only for Chess-like but even for Backgammon-like
games. Yet, (B), unfortunately, fails. Although, G2 and even G4 are too small to provide a counterexample, however, (G6, o)
has no uniform NE whenever the preferences o = (o1, o2) satisfy:
o1 : a6 > a5 > a2 > a1 > a3 > a4 > c, o2 : a3 > a2 > a6 > a4 > a5 > c, a6 > a1 > c.
To verify this, let us consider the normal form g6 in Fig. 3. By Theorem 2, there is a uniform BR of player 2 to each strategy
of player 1 and vice versa. It is not difficult to check that the obtained two sets of situations (denoted by the white discs and
black squares in Fig. 3) are disjoint. Hence, there is no uniform NE. Furthermore, it is not difficult to verify that the obtained
16 situations induce an im-cycle of length 10 and two im-paths of lengths 2 and 4 that end in this im-cycle.
Remark 14. Im-cycles exist already in g4; one of them is shown in Fig. 3 for the preferences
o1 : a2 > a1 > a3 > a4 > c, o2 : a3 > a2 > a4 > a1 > c.
Yet, two uniform Nash equilibria also exist in this case; see Fig. 3. Moreover, a tedious case analysis shows that the game
form G4 (and, of course, G2) are UNS, unlike G6.
For n = 3 a simpler counterexample to Conjecture (B) was obtained in [7]. It is given by the game structure G3 and the
preference profile
o = (o1, o2, o3) such that o1 : a2 > a1 > a3 > c, o2 : a3 > a2 > a1 > c o3 : a1 > a3 > a2 > c.
In other words, for each player i ∈ I = {1, 2, 3} to terminate is an average outcome; it is better (worse) when the next
(previous) player terminates; finally, if nobody does then the di-cycle c appears, which is the worst outcome for all. The
considered game has an im-cycle of length 6, which is shown in Fig. 2. Indeed, let player 1 terminate at a1, while 2 and 3
proceed. The corresponding situation (a1, a1, a1) can be improved by 2 to (a1, a2, a1), which in its turn can be improved by
1 to (a2, a2, a2).
Let us repeat the same procedure two times more to obtain the im-cycle of length six shown in Fig. 2.
The remaining two situations (a1, a2, a3) and (c, c, c) appear when all three players simultaneously terminate or,
respectively, proceed. These situations are not NE either. Moreover, each of them can be improved by every player. Thus,
there is no uniform NE in the obtained game.
A Backgammon-like non-INS game corresponding to this example was shown in [7].
Let us recall that, in general, an initialized Backgammon-like game is assigned to each non-initialized Chess-like game,
as in Fig. 1; furthermore, the former is INS if and only if the latter is UNS, by Theorem 1. Thus, the above examples allow us
to fill with ‘‘N ’’ the first four positions of columns 3 and 5 of Table 1.
Theorem 3. IAC and UAC fail, respectively, for Backgammon- and Chess-like two-person games in which c is ranked as the worst
outcome by both players. 
4. Backward induction for Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs
The classical backward induction procedure [30,31,16] searching for Nash equilibria in the n-person Chess-like games,
modeled by the trees, can be easily extended to Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs; see, for example, [1,8].
Moreover, this modification implies UAC, as well.
Theorem 4. Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs are uniformly acyclic, that is, UAC (together with UNS, IAC, and INS)
hold.
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Proof. In fact, all uniform NE can be obtained by the standard backward induction procedure.
Let gameG = (G,D, u) be aminimal counterexample, that is,G has an im-cycle Y , the digraphG = (V , E) has no di-cycle,
and there is no similar example G′ with a digraph G′ smaller than G.
By minimality of G, for every move e = (v, v′) ∈ E of a player i (that is, v ∈ Vi) there are two successive strategy profiles
x, x′ ∈ Y such that e is chosen by xi and not chosen by x′i . Indeed, otherwise we can eliminate e from G (if e is not chosen
by any strategy of Y ) or all other arcs from v (if e is chosen by all strategies of Y ), and Y remains an im-cycle in the reduced
game G′, as well.
By acyclicity of G, there is a position v ∈ V \VT such that eachmove (v, v′) from it leads to a terminal position v′ ∈ VT . Let
us choose such a position v, delete all arcs (v, v′) fromG, and denote the obtained reduced graph byG′ and the corresponding
game by G′. By construction, v is a terminal position in G′. Let us consider two cases:
Case 1: v ∈ VR is a position of chance. Then, for each player i ∈ I , let us define the terminal payoff u(i, v) as an average
of u(i, v′) for all moves (v, v′) from v in G.
Case 2: v ∈ Vi is a private position of a player i ∈ I . Then, u(i, v)will be defined as the maximum of u(i, v′) for all moves
(v, v′) from v. Let such a maximum be realized in v′0. Then u(i′, v) = u(i′, v′0) for all i′ ∈ I . Obviously, every strategy profile
of an im-cycle will choose in v a move (v, v′0). Such a move may be not unique, yet, by the laziness condition, it will remain
unchanged in the considered im-cycle.
In both cases, games G and G′ are equivalent. In particular, the im-cycle in G remains an im-cycle in G′, in contradiction
with the minimality of G. Thus, UAC holds for the game G = (G,D, u)whenever G is an acyclic digraph. 
In fact, the above arguments imply stronger and more constructive statements. Let us choose successively the pre-
terminal positions v ∈ V \ VT and make them terminal, as shown above. Furthermore, we will fix an optimal move,
maximizing u(i, ∗), whenever v ∈ Vi is a private position. Obviously, in k = |V \ VT | steps, we obtain a strategy profile x∗.
This recursive procedure is known as backward induction; it was suggested in the early fifties by Kuhn [30,31] and Gale [16];
the profile x∗ is called the Backward Induction (or sophisticated) Equilibrium (BIE). Since a sequence of lazy BR improvements
(a lazy im-path) cannot cycle, as shown above, it must terminates in a BIE.
Furthermore, it is also clear that every BIE is a uniform NE. Moreover, the inverse is true too.
Corollary 2. The sets of all BIE and NE coincide in each Backgammon-like game on an acyclic digraph.
Finally, the BIE is unique, in absence of positions of chance and ties.
Corollary 3. A Chess-like game on an acyclic digraph has a unique BIE if payoffs u(i, ∗) have no ties.
Proof. Both above statements easily follow from an analysis of the backward induction procedure. 
Remark 15. It is a curious combinatorial problem to bound the length of a shortest (or longest) im-path from a situation x
to a BIE x∗. Yet, these problems have no practical value, since it is much easier to obtain a BIE x∗ by backward induction (in
|V \ VT | steps) rather than by constructing an im-path to x∗ from x.
Remark 16. Let us note that the laziness assumption is essential. Indeed, otherwise, an im-cyclemay appear, as the example
in Fig. 4 shows. It is easy to verify that the obtained im-cycle contains only BR uniform improvements, yet, they are not lazy.
Let us also notice that the payoffs have ties. However, even if the terminals are totally ordered, in presence of random
positions, ties still may appear in the backward induction procedure.
The example in Fig. 4 is slightly more complicated than Example 3 of [32] showing that an im-cycle can appear if the
players are allowed to change their decisions beyond the actual play. However, some improvements of the obtained im-
cycle are not uniform and not lazy; see Sections 2.7–2.9 for the definition. We had to modify Example 3, since we restrict
the players to their uniform and lazy best responses.
Finally, let us note that the backward induction procedure (and even INS and UNS) may fail in presence of a di-cycle;
see examples in Section 3. Still, a modified backward induction works for the two-person zero-sum Chess-like games; see
Section 6.
5. Mean payoff n-person games
Let us recall the model of Section 2 and introduce the following modifications. Let (G,D) be a non-initialized positional
game structure, in which G = (V , E) is a digraph and D : V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn ∪ VR ∪ VT is a partition of its positions. Without
any loss of generality, we may assume that there are no terminals, VT = ∅, since each terminal v ∈ VT can be replaced by a
loop ev = (v, v).
Let us introduce a local reward function r : I × E → R, whose value r(i, e) is interpreted as a profit obtained by the
player i ∈ I whenever the play passes the arc e ∈ E.
As before, all players are restricted to their pure positional strategies. A strategy profile x ∈ X uniquely defines a Markov
chain on V . Whenever we fix also an initial position v0 ∈ V , this chain defines a unique limit probability distribution
q = q(x, v0) on V , that is, q(v) = q(x, v0, v) = limt→∞ t(v)/t , where t(v) is the expected fraction of the total time t
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Fig. 4. A uniformly BR (but not lazy) im-cycle. This example shows that the laziness assumption is essential for UAC. Solid lines define the strategies of
the players. The initial position (on the top) can belong to any player or be random. This example is similar to Example 3 of [32]. Yet, unlike Example 3, it
represents a uniform and lazy BR im-cycle.
that the play spends in v. Respectively, for a move e = (v, v′) in a random position v ∈ VR, we obtain the limit probability
q(e) = q(x, v0, e) = q(v)q(v, v′), where q(v, v′) is the probability of the considered move (v, v′) in v.
Then, the effective limit payoff (or in other words, the normal form of the considered positional games) is defined as a
real-valued function f : I × X × (V \ VT )→ R, where f (i, x, v0) =e∈E q(x, v0, e)r(i, e).
The deterministic case, VR = ∅, is also of interest. In this case, given x ∈ X and v0 ∈ V , we obtain a play p = p(x, v0),
which can be viewed as a deterministic Markov chain. Since all players are restricted to their positional strategies, p(x) is a
lasso, which consists of an initial part and a di-cycle C = C(x, v0) in G repeated infinitely. Then, q(e) = q(x, v0, e) = |C |−1
for e ∈ C and q(e) = 0 for e ∉ C .
In the literature on mean payoff games, usually the two-person zero-sum case is considered, since not much is known
for other cases. The most important statement is as follows.
Theorem 5. Two-person zero-sum mean payoff games are UNS; in other words, every such game has a saddle point (NE) in
uniformly optimal strategies. 
This is just a reformulation of the fundamental result of [18,34]. For the two-person zero-sum case, the abovemodel (first
introduced in [25]) and the classical Gillette model [18] are equivalent [5,8].
However, IAC (and UAC) may fail for two-person zero-summean payoff games even in the absence of random positions.
Let us consider the complete bipartite 2 by 2 digraph G on four vertices v1, v3 ∈ V1 and v2, v4 ∈ V2; see Fig. 5. Let the local
rewards of player 1 be
r(1, (v1, v2)) = r(1, (v2, v1)) = r(1, (v3, v4)) = r(1, (v4, v3)) = 1,
r(1, (v1, v4)) = r(1, (v4, v1)) = r(1, (v2, v3)) = r(1, (v3, v2)) = −1,
while r(2, e)+ r(1, e) ≡ 0 for all arcs e ∈ E, since the game is zero-sum.
The corresponding normal form is of size 4× 4.
It is not difficult to verify that the strategy profile x = (x1, x2) defined by the strategies
x1 = {(v1, v2), (v3, v4)} and x2 = {(v2, v3), (v4, v1)} is a uniform saddle point, which results in the di-cycle
(v1, v2, v3, v4); see Fig. 5. Yet, the following four strategy profiles define an im-cycle
x1 = (x′1, x′2), x2 = (x′1, x′′2), x3 = (x′′1, x′′2), x4 = (x′′1, x′2), where
x′1 = {(v1, v2), (v3, v2)}, x′′1 = {(v1, v4), (v3, v4)}, x′2 = {(v2, v1), (v4, v1)}, x′′2 = {(v2, v3), (v4, v3)},
which is invariant with respect to all possible initial positions.
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Fig. 5. An im-cycle in a mean payoff game. The corresponding four strategy profiles are shown in Section 5.
Remark 17. It is easily seen that the above im-cycle is uniformly BR but not lazy. A lazy uniformly BR im-cycle was
constructed by Oudalov [38] for a two-person zero-sum mean payoff game without random moves. This (computer-
generated and still unpublished) example required a 4× 4 complete bipartite digraph.
It is also known that INS (and UNS) may fail for a two-person (but not zero-sum) mean payoff game, even in absence of
random positions. In other words, the zero-sum assumption is essential in Theorem 5.
To see this, let us recall an example from [22]; see also [25,8]. Let G be the complete bipartite 3× 3 digraph and the local
rewards of players 1 and 2 on its 18 arcs be given by the following two 3× 3 matrices:
0 0 1
ε 0 0
0 ε 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
1− ε 0 1
where r(i, (v, v′)) = r(i, (v′, v)) for each player i ∈ I = {1, 2} and every pair of oppositely directed arcs (v, v′), (v′, v), and
where ε is a small positive number, say, ε = 0.1.
Let us fix an arbitrary initial position, construct the corresponding normal form of size 33×33 = 27×27, and choose the
BR of player 1 in every row and BR of player 2 in every column. It was shown in [22] that the obtained two sets of di-cycles
are disjoint. Hence, there is no NE. In [23], it was shown that the above example is minimal, since INS holds for all games on
2 by k bipartite digraphs.
Let us now demonstrate that n-person Backgammon-like games form a very special subclass of n-person mean payoff
games [8]. The reduction is simple. Let G = (G,D, u) be a non-initialized Backgammon-like n-person game. First, without
any loss of generality, we can assume that u(i, c) = 0 for all i ∈ I . Indeed, to enforce this condition it is sufficient to subtract
u(i, c) from the payoff u(i, ∗) of each player i ∈ I . More precisely, given a payoff u : I × A → R let us define a payoff
u′ : I × A → R by formula u′(i, a) = u(i, a)− u(i, c) for all i ∈ I, a ∈ VT , and denote the obtained game by G′ = (G,D, u′).
Then, let us get rid of VT by adding a loop ev = (v, v) to each terminal position v ∈ VT , setting the local reward
r(i, ev) = u′(i, v) for each such loop, and r(i, e) ≡ 0 for all other arcs e ∈ E and all players i ∈ I . Thus, we obtain a
non-initialized mean payoff game G′′ = (G′,D′, r). The following statements are obvious:
• all three games G,G′, and G′′ are equivalent;
• G is a Chess-like game if and only if G′′ (and G′) are deterministic (that is, VR = ∅);
• all rewards r(i, e) are positive (non-negative) inG′′ if and only if c is theworst (maybe, not strictly) outcome for all players
i ∈ I of G;
• G,G′, and G′′ can be two-person and/or zero-sum only simultaneously.
6. Two-person (zero-sum) Chess- and Backgammon-like games
Let us recall that UNS (and UAC) may fail for two-person Chess-like games, even when c is the worst outcome for all
players; see examples g2 and g6 of Section 3. Respectively, by Theorem 1, INS may fail for the corresponding Backgammon-
like games.
In contrast, IAC (and INS) hold for the Chess-like, not necessarily zero-sum, two-person games. This follows from
Theorem 2 of [1]; see also [7,8] for the case of INS.
Remark 18. It is a fundamental open problem whether INS still holds for n-person Chess-like games; see Section 8. It is
known that UNS may fail already when n = 3 and c is the worst outcome for all three players; see example g3 in Section 3.
For IAC, a similar example is known [1] only for n = 4, while for n = 3 the question remains open.
For the rest of this section, we assume that all considered games are two-person zero-sum unless the opposite is said
explicitly.
Let us recall that IAC (and UAC) may fail for Backgammon-like games, as it was shown in 1993 by Condon [12]. Yet, UNS
(and INS) hold and can be derived from Theorem 5 and the reduction of Section 5.
E. Boros et al. / Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 772–788 785
Remark 19. Such a proof looks like ‘‘a big gun for a small fly’’. Indeed, all known proofs of Theorem 5 are sophisticated and
based on the Hardy–Littlewood Tauberian theorems [27] that summarize relations between the Abel and Cesaro averages.
The first proof was given in 1957 by Gillette [18]. Yet, he did not verify the ‘‘Tauberian conditions’’ accurately and this flaw
was repaired only in 1969 by Liggett and Lippman [34].
However, we have no simpler proof for the UNS of Backgammon-like games, although they represent just a very special
case of the mean payoff games. In contrast, for Chess-like games, UAC (together with the remaining three properties) hold
and can be proved much easier as follows.
First, let us show that in a Chess-like game G = (G,D, u) a uniform NE (that is, a saddle point) x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) exists and it
can be found by a modified backward induction algorithm, which was recently and independently suggested in [2,8].
Remark 20. In contrast to n-person Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs, in this case we obtain some, but not
necessarily all, uniform Nash equilibria.
In every position v ∈ V \ VT = V1 ∪ V2 we select one or several arcs such that a strategy profile x = (x1, x2) is a uniform
saddle point whenever the strategy xi requires a selected arc in each v ∈ Vi, i ∈ I = {1, 2}.
Without any loss of generality, we can make the following two assumptions:
(a) There are no parallel arcs in G, i.e., for all v, v′ ∈ V there is at most one arc e = (v, v′) from v to v′. Indeed, if there are
several such arcs we can just identify them.
(b) Player 1 ranks them terminal outcomes in the order a1 > · · · > am, while 2 ranks them in the reverse order. We assume
that the order is strict, i.e., there is no tie; see Remarks 7 and 9. Indeed, if several successive outcomes form a tie then
we can just identify the corresponding terminals in G.
Then, the infinite outcome c should be placed somewhere between a1, . . . , am and we will assume, for simplicity, that
there are no ties, again.
Remark 21. This time we say ‘‘for simplicity’’ rather than ‘‘without loss of generality’’, because some uniformly optimal
strategies might be lost due to the last assumption. However, this may happen even if we allow a tie between c and some
terminal aj.
In particular, c might be the best outcome for player 1 or 2, but obviously not for both unlessm = 0. (This is, due to the
last assumption; otherwise m = 1 would be also possible). In the case m = 0 there are no terminals at all. Hence, each
situation x ∈ X results in c and x is a uniform NE. Thus, in each position every move is optimal. Otherwise, by assumption
(b), terminal a1 is the best outcome for player 1. If a1 is an isolated vertex, we eliminate it from G; otherwise, let us fix a
move (v, a1) in G and consider the following two cases. If v ∈ V1, let us select the move (v, a1) in G and then reduce G by
contracting (v, a1) and eliminating all other moves from v.
Remark 22. At this moment, some optimal moves in v might be lost.
If v ∈ V2 then let us eliminate the arc (v, a1) from G unless there are no other moves from v in G. Then, v becomes a new
terminal. In this case, let us identify it with a1 and also select (v, a1) in the original digraph G. If (v, a1) is a unique move to
a1 then we just eliminate the obtained isolated terminal from G.
In all cases the original digraph G is reduced. Let us denote the obtained digraph by G′ and repeat the above procedure
again, etc. Each timewe choose the best terminal of player 1 or 2 until they are all eliminated and only infinite plays remain.
Then, let us select all remaining arcs in the original digraph G.
Let us notice that arcs are eliminated in the current (reduced) digraphs, while they are selected in the original digraph G,
the copy of which we keep all time.
By construction, in every position v ∈ V1∪V2 at least one arc is selected and a strategy profile x is a uniformNEwhenever
x uses a selected arc in each position v ∈ V1 ∪ V2.
Remark 23. The obtained procedure and the standard backward induction are somewhat similar. Yet, the latter gives all
uniformNE in acyclic n-person games, while the former gives some uniformNE in (two-person zero-sum) Chess-like games;
see Remarks 20 and 22 below.
Remark 24. In contrast, the complexity of getting a uniformNE (saddle point) in a Backgammon-like game is a fundamental
open problem, although the existence is implied by Theorem 5 and by the reduction of Section 5. Unfortunately, the above
algorithm cannot be extended to Backgammon-like games, which, already in the case m = 1 are equivalent with the so-
called simple stochastic games [11,12]. The latter are known to be in the intersection ofNP and co-NP and, yet, no polynomial,
or even pseudo-polynomial, algorithm for their solution is known. Andersson and Miltersen recently proved in [3] that
simple stochastic games and general Gillette’s stochastic games with perfect information are polynomially equivalent; see
also [26].
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To prove UAC for Chess-like games, we just combine the above arguments, which prove UNS, and the arguments
Section 4, which prove UAC for Backgammon-like n-person games on acyclic digraphs. Again, in a minimal counterexample
G = (G,D, u) with an im-cycle Y , for every edge e = (v, v′) ∈ Vi, i ∈ I = {1, 2}, there are two strategy profiles x, x′ ∈ Y
such that e is chosen by xi and not chosen by x′i . Yet, the arc (v, a1) (considered in the above proof of UNS) cannot satisfy
this property. Indeed, if v ∈ V1 then this move will be chosen by every strategy profile x ∈ Y , by the optimality of a1 for
player 1.
Here, it is important to recall that the players are restricted to their lazy uniformly best responses.
In contrast, if v ∈ V2 then move (v, a1) will be chosen by no x ∈ Y unless (v, a1) is a unique (forced) move in v. In both
cases, we get a contradiction with the minimality of G.
Thus, a sequence of uniform improvements cannot cycle and, hence, it must terminate in a uniform saddle point. This
implies UAC, which, in its turn, implies UNS, IAC, and INS.
The results of this section are summarized by the following two statements.
Theorem 6. • Two-person zero-sum Chess-like games are uniformly acyclic (UAC).
• Some uniform Nash equilibria can be found by the above modified backward induction procedure. 
7. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Clearly, Theorem 2 is implied by Theorem 5. Indeed, given an n-person mean payoff game in which all players but one
have their strategies fixed, we obtain a mean payoff game of the remaining single player i, or in other words, a controlled
Markov chain. It is well known that in this case a uniformly optimal strategy x∗i exists; see, for example, [4,35]. This and the
above reduction imply the statement of Theorem 2 for Backgammon-like games.
Furthermore, part (i) of Theorem 1 is obvious. In its turn, part (ii) can be derived from the Chess-like case of Theorem 2
(see Section 2.7) as follows. Let us assume indirectly that a Chess-like game G has no uniform NE. Then, for each situation
x ∈ X of its normal form there is a BR improvement for a player i ∈ I , that is, a situation y = y(i, x) ∈ X such that y may
differ from x only in the ith coordinate, u(i, g(x, v0)) ≤ u(i, g(y, v0)) for all v0 ∈ V \ T , and the inequality is strict for at least
one v0.
By assumption, q(v0) is strictly positive, that is, q(v0, v) > 0 for all v ∈ V \ (VT ∪ {v0}). Hence, in G′, situation y is still an
improvement of x (although not necessarily BR) for the same player i. Since this holds for all x ∈ X , we conclude that there
is no NE in G′. 
Remark 25. The strict positivity of q(v0) is essential in the above arguments. For example, if q(v0, v) = 0 for all but one
v ∈ V \ (VT ∪ {v0}) then G′ is a Chess-like game too and its INS (with respect to v0) holds for all known examples, perhaps,
even in general.
8. Chess-like n-person games and the INS-conjecture for additive payoffs
According to Table 1, INS of n-person Chess-like games remains an open problem. There is no counterexample and no
proof, even under assumption (iii) of Section 1: c is the worst outcome for all n players. Yet, we conjecture that under this
assumption INS holds.
In this sectionwe shall recall amuch stronger conjecture suggested in [7]. Given an initialized Chess-like positional game
structure (G,D, v0), let us introduce a local reward function r : I × E → R. The real number r(i, e) is interpreted as the
profit obtained by player i ∈ I when the play passes arc e ∈ E.
Let us recall that, in absence of random moves, each strategy profile x ∈ X defines a unique play p = p(x) that begins in
the initial position v0 and either (j) terminates at a = g(x) ∈ VT or (jj) results in a lasso that consists of an initial path and
a simple di-cycle c = c(x) ∈ C(G). The additive effective payoff u : I × X → R is defined in case (j) as the sum of all local
rewards of the obtained play, u(i, x) =e∈p(x) r(i, e), and in case (jj) u(i, x) ≡ −∞, for all i ∈ I . In other words, in case (jj)
all infinite plays are equivalent and ranked as theworst outcome by all players, in agreementwith (iii). Yet, in case (j) payoffs
may depend not only on the terminal position a = g(x) but on the entire play p(x).
The following two equivalent assumptions were considered in [7]:
(t) all local rewards are non-positive, r(i, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E, i ∈ I , and
(tt) all di-cycles are non-positive,

e∈c r(i, e) ≤ 0 for all c ∈ C = C(G), i ∈ I .
Obviously, (t) implies (tt). Moreover, it was shown in 1958 by Gallai [17] that in fact these two assumptions are equivalent,
since (t) can be enforced by a potential transformationwhenever (tt) holds; see [17] and also [7] for the definitions andmore
details.
Remark 26. In [7], players i ∈ I minimize cost functions −u(i, x) rather than maximize payoffs u(i, x). Hence, (t) and (tt)
turn into non-negativity conditions for local costs.
It was proven in [7] that INS holds under conditions (t) and (tt) for the so-called play-once games defined by the following
extra condition
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(ttt) |Vi ≤ 1| ∀i ∈ I; in other words, each player controls at most one position.
It was conjectured in [7] that assumptions (t) and (tt) imply INS in general, evenwithout (ttt), and this INS-conjecturewas
verified for several non-trivial examples. It was also shown in [7] that conditions (t) and (tt) are essential, that is, without
(t) and (tt), INS may fail, even when (ttt) holds.
It is easily seen that each terminal payoff is a special case of an additive one [7]. To show this, let us just set r(i, e) = u(i, a)
whenever e = (v, a) is a terminal move in G and r(i, e) ≡ 0 otherwise. Let us also notice that no terminal move can belong
to a di-cycle. Hence, conditions (t) and (tt) hold for a terminal payoff automatically.
Obviously, a proof of the INS-conjecture for additive payoffs would answer in positive the second question of Table 1,
yet, the first one would still remain open.
Remark 27. The concept of an additive payoff can be naturally extended to n-person Back-gammon-like games. Yet, INS for
these games may fail already for terminal payoffs; see Section 3.
9. Why Chess and Backgammon can be solved in pure positional uniformly optimal strategies
Chess and Backgammon can be viewed as two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and limiting
mean effective payoff; see Section 6 or, for example, [8]. Solvability of such games in pure positional uniformly optimal
strategies was proven in 1957 by Gillette [18]. The proof is quite involved; it is based on the classical Hardy–Littlewood
(1931) Tauberian theorems [27] that summarize relations between the Abel and Cesaro averages. Conditions of [27] were
not accurately verified in [18] and this flaw was repaired only in 1969 by Liggett and Lippman [34]. Let us recall that the
above reduction results in a very special local rewards for Chess and Backgammon (as well as for n-person Chess- and
Backgammon-like games): r(i, e) = 0 unless e = (v, v) is the loop corresponding to a terminal v ∈ VT .
Nevertheless, in the case of Backgammon, we are not aware of any simpler proof of solvability.
Furthermore, in presence of randompositions, no efficient solution algorithm is known. Andersson andMiltersen [3] (see
also [26]) recently demonstrated that the general Gillettemodel (and, in particular, the two-person zero-sumBackgammon-
like gameswithm terminals) can be polynomially reduced to the casem = 1, that is, to simple stochastic games, introduced
in 1992byCondon [11,12]. Although the latter class is in the intersection ofNP and co-NP [11], yet, even apseudo-polynomial
algorithm is not currently known.
In contrast, the situation with two-person zero-sum Chess-like games is much better. Proofs of solvability were given in
the early works by Zermelo [42], König [29], and Kalmar [28]. Surveys of these results and, in particular, of their relations to
the classical Chess defined by the FIDE rules can be found in [14,41,39]. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, an efficient algorithm
was given only in 2009, independently in [2,8]. This algorithm (a modified backward induction) finds some, but not all,
positional uniformly optimal strategies of both players in (almost) linear time; see [2] for more details. Let us note that not
only UNS but also UAC can be derived for the considered games; see Section 6.
Two-person zero-sum Chess- and Backgammon-like games can naturally be extended to the n-person case. In this case,
the concept of a saddle point is replaced with an equilibrium (NE) suggested in 1950 by Nash [36,37]. Soon after Nash’s
work, Kuhn [30,31] and Gale [16] suggested an algorithm (backward induction) which finds all uniform (subgame perfect)
NE in positional strategies for the n-person Chess-like gamesmodeled by trees. This algorithm can be easily extended to the
Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs. Moreover, UNS can be strengthened to UAC; see Section 4.
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